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ON THE ACCURACY AND PROPERTIES OF
RECENT MACROECONOMIC FO!ECASTS
Abstract
The aim of this study is to contribute to the measurement and analysis
of errors in economists' predictions of changes in aggregate income, output,
and. the prIce level. n11samplestudies of forecasts can be instructive,
it their limitations must be recognized. Compilation of consistent forecast
records extending over longer periods of tine is necessary to establish a
reasonably reliable base for assessments of forecasting behavior and. perfor—
mance. Thus the historical record of post—World War II forecasts assembled
in the 1960's by the NB is here extended and updated.
The end—of—year predictions of annual percentage changes in GNP earn
good marks for overall accuracy when judged according to realistic rather
than ideal standards. Moreover, they are found to have improved significantly
in the period since the early l96O s compared with the previous years after
World War II.
The corresponding predictions for GNP in constant dollars (real
growth) and the GNP implicit price index (inflation) are considerably poorer.
The former suffer fran large turning point errors, the latter from large
underestimation errors. Indeed, forecasts of inflation are not much better
than projections of the most recently observed inflation rates, and they lag
behind the actual rates much like such projections. But the errors in
forecasts of real growth are negatively correlated with the errors in forecasts
of inflation, which helped to make the nominal GNP predictions more accurate.Abstract —2—
Forecastsfor the year as a whole canbesatisfactory when basedon
agood record for the first twoquarters;they tend.to be more accurate than
forecastswith longer spans. An exaiination of the recent multiperiod pre-
dictions fr veU—kiown econometric models and. business outlooksurveys shov
thatthe errors for real growth and inflation cumulated rapid.ly beyond. the
spans.of 2 to 1 cpiarters. Previous studies have shon the cumulation to be
asarule less than proportional to the increase in the span, but in the
period of recession and recovery 1973—75 the build—up oferrors was much
greater.Again the nominal GNP forecasts benefitted from offsetting errors
as the rise inprices was heavily underestimated andthe downturn in real
activity was missed. Forecasters were generally unprepared for the concurrence
of accelerating inflation and slowing, then declining output rates: they
optimistically(and. probably also from a lingering faith in a simple Phillips
trade-off) kept anticipating less inflation andmoregrowth.
Atthe present time, the predictive value of detailed multiperiod
forecasts reaching out further than a few quarters ahead must be rather
heavily discounted. No doubt, in periods less turbulent than the recent
past the longer forecasts can be considerably more accurate, but thiz fair—
weatherargument is not very persuasive or helpful.
Victor Zarnowitz
Graduate School of !3usiness
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois 60637
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Victor Zarnowitz
I.On Some Uses andlimitationsof Forecast Data
Howand how well economists forecast, and how much their predictions
• help or hurt public and. private decision mdcing, are matters thatoughtto
receive much attention of the profession. This is so ot only because of
their directinterest to the authors, users, and critics of the forecasts,
butalso becauseoftheir intrinsicbut less evident academic interest. hat
isthe practical applicability of economic analysis in this critical area?
l4hatis the qualityofforesight and counsel that canbe expected of respon-
sible economists?These arebroadquestions whichare noteasy to answer,
but theyare basicand.surely deserveto be tackled. Thisrequiresthat we
systematically confront forecasts as indications ofhow economistscx ante
thoughteventsare likelytoun.foldwithcx post knowledge of what actually
did.happen and how.The aims, from tieleastto t.emostambitious, are(1)
tomeasure forecast errors, (2) to explain them, and (3)tolearn how to
reduce them in the future.
Successin forecasting may be occasional and. fortuitous orintuitive,
butprogress in. forecasting, to the extent it is possible, can only come from
advances of science, not art or chance. It presupposesthatsu.fficiently
important and persistentregularities in economic processes andrelationships
ed.standbe properly identified and. used. Learning processes areinvolved,
whichcan betime-consumingarid, discontinuous,reflecting in. partthe shifts
anddiscontinuities inthe econrmc change itself,inpart the inadequacies
ofmeasurementandanalysis.
Dataon economic forecasts generally cover short tine periods. Iørlg
tine series onconsistentpredictions simply do not exist. Few ifanyfore-
cast setsare fully identified according to the many aspects and. dimensions2
thatmatter (source,target,timing,assumptions,data, models,andmethods
used),so that itis often d.ifficult to determine what constitutes a suitable
"sample"of forecasts of a given type. Moreover, few forecasters leave their
models and. techniq.ues unchanged for long as they seek inprovements and try to
adapt to new developments in the economy. Hence, a particular forecaster's
past record is often a hi.ly uncertain basis for inferences how he will
perform in the future.
Evenmore hazardous, if not irresponsible, are attempts to grade fore-
casters on the evidence of how well they predicted change in. a particular
short period, say, a year or a few years. C].early, on any individual occasion
sce forecasters will, be ahead of others by sheer chance or for some idio-
syncratic reasons. Strong evidence of significant and stable differences over
time would be required to rank the forecasting individuals, groups, or models
with a modicum of confidence, and, such evidence is essentially lacking
(Zarnowitz, 1967, 1971; Christ; McNees, 1975).
The proliferation in recent years of mu.ltiperiod. quarterly macro-
forecastz offers no substitute for long historical series. These are rich
datacontaining much interesting material that certainly deserves to be care-
fully recorded and analyzed. However, such forecasts, and. so their errors,
tend. to be internally correlated in at least two ways: (a) serially, Within
eachsequence made from a given base period. and (b) across the successive
sequences, which overlap and thus refer partially to the sane target period.
Each multiperiod forecast is a joint product of the common infornation,
technique, and juderit used, and each depends on previo..s forecasts of which
it is to some extent a revision. Thus, errors in the data, models, procedures,
and jtidents, autocorrelated disturbances, and certain types of distributed
lagsareall likely to induce interdepend.encies within and between the multi-3
periodforecasts. Theresultingcomplex correlation structures resist estima-
tion,given the small samples of comparable predictions from any giverxsource.
Consequently, measures of average accuracy, bias, etc., calcui.atedfrom such
samples are difficult to interpret from the viewpoint ofstatistical inference
(Spivey and. Wrobleski).
Two conclusions are surelyvalid.. First,small-sample studies cf fore-
casts are still needed and can be instructive, but their llmi tations must be
recognized. Second, it is necessary to compile and. examine forecast records
extending as far back in time as possible, so as to gain information, take a
lcnger view of forecasting behavior and. performance, and place the short
records of recent predictions in a proper perspective. Historical data on•
post-World. War II forecasts assembled in the 1960's by the National Bureau.
of Economic Research provide a good base here, which I was able to partially
extend and update. Some pre1cm1nary results for annual forecasts of three
variablesarereported below.
II.The Record of AnnualGNPForecasts Since 1914.7
In theearly post-WorldWarIIperiod, most forecasts were made near
the end of thecalendaryearforthe next yearandmost referred to GNPin
currentdollars. The evidencewe have on such forecasts goes back to 1914.7
but is quite fragmentary for the late 1914O's and early 1950's.
The period of transition from thewareconomy witnessed the largest
errors on record in theGNPforecasts.Even after the 1914.5-14.6 predictions
wereshown to have greatly underestimated the then prev±ling levels ci' economic
activity (Klein, 1914.6), expectations of a business slump stubbornly persisted.
One =a].l, reputable group of private forecasters came up with anaverage
prediction for 1914.7 of a 6percentdecline in G?, whereas the actual change
turned out to be a rise of about U percent. For 1914.8 the group predicted aII.
fractionaldecline but GNPinsteadadvanced again at much the same surprisingly
high rate. The failure of forecasts during these years was widespread, with
but a few partial except±ons; the develonents of the time could not be
predicted well, with estimates based on data and relationships for the 1930's
and false analogies with the early post-World War I period. When a recession
finally cane late in 191.8, it proved shorter than many had. expected. A
"consensus forecast" by znre than 30 respondents polled in December l9!.8
anticipated well the decline of nearly 2% in TP during 1919, but a year
1tter the sane group was wide off the mark in predicting a d.rop of3.5%
whileGP actually staged a strong cneback in 1950 with a rise exceeding 10%.
• The evidence for the period 1953-76 is stimr'ized in Table 1 in terms
.of compar1sou. between the predicted and the actual annual percentage changes.
It is generally instructive to analyze forecast errors in terms of levels,
absolute changes, and percentage changes but, if a choice must be made for
succinctness,thereare several good reasons for using percentage changes
'wheretechnicallyappropriate,particularlyforvariables with strong trends.
(1). What Is predicted in the firstplaceis changefromthelastknown or
estimated level, andpercentchanges often varylesswith the levelsand are
morestableand comparable over time thand.oflar changes.(2) The percent
changeforecastsareaptto be less affected bydata revisions. (3) some
important measures ofpredictive performance, such as rre1ations with
actualvalues, are much more meaningful for change forecasts than for level
forecasts.(14.) It is the rates of growthin economic aggregates (income,
output,prices) that are of maininterestto analysts and policy. makers.
Theforecasts are made late in the yeart -1or,in a few cases,
very early in the target year t;typically,the forecasters know the official







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aBased onsurveysconducted byJosephA. Livingston, syndicated columnist, now
with the iiladelphia Inquirer3 and published in the Piilad.elphia Bulletin and.
AmericanBanker. Of the semiannual surveys, only the end-of-year ones are
used here; they typically cover answers toa questionnairemailed in November
and, appear ina"Business Outlook" columnlatein December. The participantz
in thesesurveys,listed at the end of the Bulletin columns, varied in number
between 1J and.62.
bAverage c end-of-year annual GNP forecasts the following sources: (1)
Fortune magazine ("Business Roundup"); (2) Harris Trust and Savings Bank;
(3) IBM Economic Research Department; (11.)NationalSecurities and. Research
Corporation;(5)NICB (now Conference Board) Economic Forum; (6) Robert W.
Paterson,University of Missouri; (7) Prudential Insurance Company of America;
(8) UCLk Business Forecasting Project. The earliest of these predictions
were made in October, the latest in January. st but not all of the fore-
casts in each of these eight sets are available in published form; those for
the period ending in 1969 were analyzed in IBER studies of economic fore-
casting (Zarziowitz, 1967, 1972, 19711').
the semiannual forecasts ofthisgroup, onliy the end-of-year ones are
included.The group mean forecasts used herecover individual predictions
varying in numberbetween31 and. 39. These data, too, were analyzed in I1B
studies (see ref. innoteb), but no forecasts were collected for the period
after1963.The predictions for1956-58were madeinOctober, those for
1959-63 in December.
Cisource: Qp.arterly releases by the American Statistical Association and. the
National Bureau of Economic Research, published in the ASA AniStatNews and.
the BER co1orations in Economic Research. Median forecastsfromthe
November surveys only' are used.. The membership in. these surveys varied.
between 11.5and814..See Zarnowitz, 1969, and V.andJ.Su,1975.
eRorecasts by the Council ofEconomicAdvisers (CEA) as stated in. the Economic
Report (usually as the midpoint in a relatively narrow range). As a rule,
the Economic Reort appears in January. For some earlier studies of these
forecasts, see Moore, 1969 and 1977; Za.rnowitz, 1972; FeUer, 1976; MeNees,
1977.
published ex ante forecasts from, theResearch Seminarin i.antitative
Economics(RsQ) ofthe University of Michigan. Based onseveral working
models (see Suits, 1962;Eyrnaris and Shapiro, 1970 and 19711.). The forecasts
arethosereleased in connection withthe Universityof Michigan an.nu.al
"Conferenceon the Economic Outlook,"occurring usually in November(in
19711.and1975,December).
Wharton Economic Newsletter, Econometric Forecasting Unit, Wharton
Schoolof Finance&Commerce, University of Pennsylvania. Forecasts based
on aseries ofversionsof Whartonmodels. See Evans and Klein,1968;
Evans, Klein, and Saito, 1972; McCarthy, 1972; Duggal, Klein, and McCarthy,
19711. Theforecasts here covered aredated in November or (as in 1971 and
1973-75) in December.5b
Notes to Table 1 (contd..)
hAsses that next year's percentage change will be the same as that of the
previous year. The actu.al changes used are those based onthe prellmtnary
estimates explainedin note jbelow.
tAssumes that next year'spercentagechange will be the sane as the average
percentage change in the four previous years. On the actual changes used.,
seenotej.
ABased on the first official estimates following the year for whichthefore-
cast was made.
kBasedoncurrent data taken from U.S.Department ofCommerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, gandbook of Cyclical Indicators, A Supplement to the
Business Conditions Digest, May 1977.
is negative.6
yeart —1.Theactual changes used. to compute the errors are based on the
first official estimates for the year t published. early in. the following
(t +1)year. These are provisional values which are themselves partly near-
term predictions, and subsequent revisions indicate that the errors in the
early data are by no means negligible (cols. 10-11). on. the average, without
regard to sign, these revisions are about one-third the size of the forecast
errors (lines 5-8).Theerrors are computed by subtracting the actual from
the predicted (or estimated.) changes, and. they are predominantly negative,
which shows that both forecasts and the provisional figures strongly tend to
und.erstatethe changes in C.TP (lines 9-12).Byfarmostof these underestimated.
changesare increases(for a reviewof similar findings ofearlier studies,
seeZarnowitz, 1972).
Table 1 discloses a substantial correspondence between the forcasts
and. the realizations. The predicted changes approd.niate the actual ones well
in each period covered, the averages of the former being generally less than
one percentage point smaller than the averages of the latter (lines 1_li.).
Wflere the mean actual changes increased (is from 5% p.a. in 1956-63 to8%
pa. in 1963-76), so did the mean predicted changes; moreover, the discrepan-
cies between the two diminished in the latter years. The forecasts are in
all casesconsiderably more accurate thanthe naive model which assumes that
next year' spercentagechange will be the sameas that of the previous year
and more accurate than the--somewhat less naive--tread extrapolation model
which projects the average percentage change of the four previousyears.
Collectively,the mean absolute error of forecasts is less than halfthatof
thefirst naive model' (lines 5-8, col.8),aridthe ratio of the two declines
from 0.11.7 in 1956-63 to 0.11.3 in 1963-76 and 0.311. in 1969-76. Thecorresponding
ratiosfor comparisons of the forecasts with the four-year moving average
(:trefldu) extrapolations (col. 9) are O.8!i., 0.56, ar.do.1.7
The average error measures are imDortant but they fall far short of
telling the whole story. Measures of correlation (which unfortunately are
often omitted from forecast evaluations) are needed to show how well the
predicted changes have tracked the actual changes over tii. The r coeffi-
cients for the forecasts covered in Table 1 areallpositive andsignificant;
the r2 statistics generally exceed 0.5and,for the more recent periods,
average 0.7 or higher (lines 13—16, cola. 1—7). In contrast, the corresponding
coefficients for the extrapolations (cols. 8 arid. 9) are zero or near—zero
(where larger, r is negative).
Because sufficiently long and consistent annualtime-seriesdata for IP are
notavailable, no attempt was made 'ere to test theforecasts againsthier
startsdsprovided bymore effective extrapolationmethodssuchasthe auto-
regressive integrated movingaverage(ARmA) models. However, recent com-
parisons of quarterlyforecastswith such modelsshowthe forecasts to be on
theaveragemore accurate (Hirsch, Grimm, and Narasixnham; rist; Spiveyand.
Wrobleski), and I would expect this to be a true for the annual fore-
casts and particularly with respect to the correlations withthe actual values.
ie evidence supports theconclusionthat the end-of-year forecasts of
current-doUarGNP next year hada reasonably satisfactory record of accuracy
since1953. Indeed, in comparisons with earlier forecasts (Sapir; Okun;
Zarriowitz, 1967),thatrecord improved considerably in the 1960's and. even in
the 1970's, a turbulent period presumed to have been particularly difficult
to forecast.
It must be noted that our collection iscertainly riorandomsample,
includingas itdoes the official Administration forecasts and. several of the
mostreputable andinfluential sets of private predictions by businessand.
academic economists (seenotes toTable 1). It is also truethatour data8
and.measures have some shortcomings that must not be overlooked. In particular.
theestimates of the cu.crerit position (ECP) thich the forecaster actually used
as the starting point or base are not always reported. In some cases, there-
fore, the base values had. to be imputed., which was doneusing data as of the
(preciseor approximated) date of the fortcast plus such information as was
available on how the forecaster derived his ECP's on other occasions. The
imputations, even if carefully made, undoubtedly contain some errors. However,
theseerrors aredefinitelynot such as to invalidatethe broad conclusions
1 of this paper.
More detailed inferences concerning te relative accuracy of the different
forecast sets covered. cannot be drawn from these results. One reason is that
the forecasts differ appreciably with regard to their precise dates, and. it
is knownfromprevious research that the earlier predictions have a significant
advantageover the later ones(Zarnowitz, 1967; McNees, 1975). itis relevant,
however,to make the general observation that the average error and correlation
measures do notshow large, consistent differences among theforecast sets
being compared.This is inagreementwith earlier findingswhichtogether
strongly suggest that thesearch for a consistently superior forecaster is
about as promising as the search for the philosophers? stone(Zarnowitz, 1971;
McNees,
A few further observations seem warranted. Although the forecasters
included differ in many respects, even a detailed inspection reveals few
sharp contrastsbetween their predictions for the same years. Of course,
1Otherpossible errors, also not critical, might arise fromthe fact that
someof our forecasts, lacking directly reported annual predictions, are
averagesofforecasts for shorter periods within the coming year. This could
causesome deviations from the span or target period intended bythe fore-
casters (Carison, 1977).9
competentforecasters use common data and. techniques, regularly interact,
and are often similarly influenced by recent events and. current attitudes and
ways of thinking. The genuine cxanteforecasts here considered are all to a
large extent 'judginental." Large doses of judnerit enter, mostly helpfully,
the forecasts derived with the aid. of econometric models (see, e.g., Haitovsky,
Treyz, and.Su). This could weU. tend. to reduce thedispersion among the
corresponding prediction of this type; there is indeed some evidence that
errors of ex ante forecasts with econometric models vary less than errorsof
cxpost forecasts made withoutjudental a&jtistments (irist). At thesame
time,many so-called Judgmental forecasters use partly some more or less
explicit econometric equations or models, "outside" or "own" (Zarnowitz, 1971;
V. and J.Su).While publishd forecasts by ranking practitionersareoften
developedwith particular skill or care, group average forecasts benefit over
• time greatly from cancellations of individual errors of opposite sign
(Zarnowitz, 1967 and. 1972). At any given time, the deviations between corres-
•ponding forecasts from different sources are likelyto bereduced by the
working of these balancing factors. Thus, it is not surprising that forecasts
for the same variable and. target period tend to be similar. Indeed, the cor-
relations between pairsof theforecast sets included in Table 1, computed
* forthe four periods distinguished therein, are significantly higher than the
correlations between predictions and. realizations recorded on lines 13-16.
The r2 coefficieats for eight pairs of the predicted percentage change series
'all exceed o.8, and. some are considerably higher.
Of the 110 observations comprised in our sevenforecast set3, about 61i.
percentareunderestimatesand 311.percentareoverestimates.By farmostof
the latter refer to years marked by economic recessions (19511., 1960, 1970,
19711.)orslowdowns (1962, 1967). The provisional P valuesshowbut two10
year-to-year declines in the period covered in Table 1: in 195!., which the
forecastsoverstated, and in 1958,which the forecasts missed (accounting for
the onlyturning-pointerrorsin this sample). Thus underestimation wasiimited
to the increases in GNP; moreover, it was most pronounced when the increases
were part±cularly1are asin 1953,1955-56,1965-66,1968-69,and1973.
These results suggest tim presence of "systematic" errors, but not
in the senseof a bias that could have been readily escaped or corrected
in advance. It seems difficult to discount them asmerely another manifesta-
tionof the faniliar tendency of forecasts to underestimate the observed
changes (which, forseries withrandom elements, is a property of even unbiased
arid, efficient forecasts; Mincer and. Zarnowitz, 1969;Hatanaka,1975).2hatis
underestimated. here is the average annual rateof growthina series which,
asproperly recognized by the forecasters, is trend-dominatedand. seldom
declines from year to year.Thisoutcomecanbetraced to the forecasters'
tardy recognitionof high-growthphases("booms") and, increasingly, of infla-
tion speedups,but it was also mitigated by their even tardier recognition of
business recessions and slowdowns, Such movements arerecurrentand not
purelyrandom; theyhave important,detectableregularities as shown by
historicalstudies of business cycles; but they are also nonperiodic and.
indeedvary a great deal over time, so their predictability remainsvery
limited. In any event, simple"learning from past errors" would not have been
ofmuch use here asthe errors of these forecasts generally have zero or very
lowautocorrelations.
III. Annual Forecasts ofReal GNP and the PriceLevel
Itis difficult to obtain and verify consistent forecasts of Piri
constant dollars and theimplicit price deflator (IPD) that would cover more
thanjustthe most recent period. Few business forecasters inthe 1950' and11
1960's made systematic efforts to decompose their predictionsof current-
dollarGNPinto quantity arid,priceelements. Of the forecasters with econo-
metricmodels,whopaid. mQreattention to real GNP,onlytwo(Michigan and.
hartoa)havelongerrecords.2
Table 2 shows that the predicted changes in real GITP, taken without
regard to sign, differed from the actual changes by less than one percentage
point on theaverage (lines 1-3). The predicted changes tend. to be smller
thanthe actualones,except for the CEA forecasts (col. 3) where the reverse
obtains. The mean absolute errors of the forecasts average a little over
tour tenths of those of the simple last-change extrapolatiorts in 1959-67 and
1962-76, about one third. in 1969-76 (lines i+-6, col.6).Comparisons with
extrapolationsof the average percentage changeofthe fourprevious years
givevery similarresults,except for 1959-67 where the forecast errors
average about two thirds of the extrapolation errors (lines I_6,ccl. 7).
Correlations between the predicted and actual changes areeUsignifi-
cant].y positive, and they too suggest someimprovement in recent years: the
r2coefficientsfor1969-76 are higher thanthose for theearlierandlonger
periods (lines 10-12). It is interesting to observe that all but one ofthem
exceed thecorrespondingcoefficients for current-dollal GNPforecasts,
particularlysofor the predictions with the arton models and theASA/1BER
groupmedians(ci. Table 2, line12,and. Table 1, line16).Incontrastto
the reasonably highcorrelationsfor theforecastsproper, those for the
extrapolations (cola. 6-7)are hereagain extremely low or negative.
2Someofthe econometric forecasts were released. at more than one date
near the end.ofthe year, and. in more than.oneversion depetid.ing onthedata
used or policy assumptions made. In all but a few doubtful instances where
somewhat arbitrary decisions had to be made, the forecasts chosen are those
preferred. by the forecaster or, lacking stated preferences, those which embodied
assumptions most common to the forecasts made at the time.12
TABIZ 2
J)*ART MEASURES OF ERROR OR AXft1UAL PREDICTIONS
07PERCENTAGE (LANGES fl REAL GNP, 1959-76
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Squared Correlatioa (re) Between Predictedand Actualange
.531 306d
.775 .617 .012
.936 .857 .709 .9k]. .001. •320d
Thr sources and explanations of the data used in columns 2-9, see footnotes it through k, respectively, in Table 1.
CAverage of end-of-year annual forecasts of real. GD? inferred from the forecasts of current-dollar GD?, the
consumer price index (CPI) and the wholesale price Index (WPi) from the following sources: (1) harrIs Trust
and Savings Back; (2) 1atioaal Securities and Research Corporation; (3) :1C3 (Conference Beard) Eonoeic Torum;
(Ii) Robert W. Paterson, University of Missouri; (5) UClA Business Forecasting Project. Trese forecasts were
obtained by dividing the forecasts of GD?, as reported in current dollars, by the composite price level fore-
casts, the latter are weighted su.-os of the reoorted forecasts of C?I and U?!, the weiitz being .67 and .353,
respectively (the first of these proportions represents the average ratio c'f sonsunption expenditures to GD? in
the period _L93-9). For further detail and analysis or the individual forecasts in this set, see Zarnowitz,
1968.Seealso Table 1, f'n.b.— -
forecastsfor 1962, 1963, 1965, end 1968 must be inferred from statements iAtheReport; they are con-
firmed by the Council as approximately' correct, though ot in all caoes orecisely correct Moore, 1977).
The other forecasts are all, based on figures given in the Reoort and so fully verified.
figure in psrentheaes is based on prelimina.ry CLIP figures deflated by weIghted averages of the corresoond-
Lug data for CPI and UP! (with weights as given in fn. a above). This series of "actual" values is comparable
to the forecasts used in column 1 onLy.
r is negative.13
Thesesurnarymeasures, then, present te annual forecasts ofreal GNP
in a generally favorable light. However, the accuracy of these forecasts
varied greatly indifferentyears, which at times impaired seriously their
usefulness, and this does not show upinthe snmmry. As suggested by the
averages with regard to sign (lines 7-9), the usual tendencyof forecasts to
underestimate changes prevailed inthefirst half of the period 1959-76 but
cot in the second. half. Actually, the errors varied considerably in. each sub-
period, primarily reflecting cyclical change and. inparticularthe disturbing
effects of missed downturns. Real. GNP turned down inl951.,1958, 1970, and.
19Th1.,but of the 10 predictions for these years which are available eight
specified continued rises and only two succeeded in signaling declines.
Main, and not surprisingly, nearly all ofthesignificantly large over-
etimatioa errors refer to the years during which national output grew at
relatively low or decreasing rates, and, most of the larger u.nderestiination
errors refer to the years of high real growth rates.
It is of considerable interest to note that the tn'ning-point errors
are much larger than other errors (on the average about 2 1/2-3 times larger,
for all forecasts in this collection). Thus, even though relatively few,
these directional errors had, a strong adverse impact on the overall accuracy
ofthereal GNP forecasts, as indicated by the following tabulation.
MeanPbso1utePercert of Total
NumberError, %Points Absolute Error
Underestimation errors 33 1.12
Overestimation errors 21 0.92 214.11.
Turning-pointerrors 8 2.85 28.8This evidence cntradicts the argument that turning-point rrorsmatter
littlebecause they are few arid. far between (cf. Samuelsori). Bat the argument
goes further to say that such few large errors are the necessary (and small)
price to pay for the avoidance of many large errors "between turning points"
by means of optimal estimation procedures such as least squares. However, it
is not clear that these procedures imply more than that the variance ofthe
pred.icted.changes must be less than that of the actual changes (and progres-
sively declining as the forecast span is lengthened.). The inevitability
(indeed;even the existence) of a trade-off between errors at major turning
points and other errors has never been demonstrated, and it would seern a
e.u.nsel of despair for the forecasters to accept it. Prediction-of cyclical
turns in suchseriesas real GIP, though certainly difficult, is oat nieces-
•
sarily impossIble,particularly on an annual basis (note the good record. in
forecasting troughs). In sum, there are indeed. strong reasons for makers arid.
usersof economic forecasts to give a great deal of attention to turning-
point errors.Actually, most of them realize this, as shown by the widespread
practice of analyzing such errors (Hicinan, ed., 1972; studies in I.E.R.,
19714._75). However,there is certainly muchneed for improvement here, and
room for some new initiatives (e.g., on. how to use current signals from
leading indicators, see Vaccara and. Zarnowitz).
The worst single year for the predictions covered. in Table 2 was 19714.,
onthe e'e of which forecasters across the field missed the onset of a serious
recession. This, plus the smaller turnin;-Doint errors for 1970, arethe
main reasons for the rise in the average errors of these forecasts in1969-76
comparedwith the earlier years. But the rise in. the absolute errorswas not
large, and there was no decline in accuracy as measured by the criteria of
cumparisoris with extrapolations and correlations of predicted with actual
changes(Table 2, cols. 3 and ii.).Limited evidencefrom one longer series of15
forecastssuggests that real Pwaspredictedwithsimilar average errors in
the two 8-year periods 1953-60 and. 1969-76, with much smaller errors in the
relatively quietyears 1961-68.
Although theforecastsof real(NP are about asgood. relative to our
simpleextrapolativebew4imkmodels as arethe forecastsof GNP in current
dollers,theyare less accurate in termsofcomparisons of theerrorswith
theactual percentage changes to be predicted.The pointis that theextra-
• polations perform substantially better fornoniaal GNP than for real GNP.
This can be shownbydividing the errorofextrapolationinto thesize of
theactualchange, without regardtosign, whichgives the following overall
ratios for theXl (last changc) and. (average change) models:
• (P-—U, o.14; X2, 0.30 Real GNP-—Xl, 0.78; X2, o.68
Theseresults accord withexpectations, since the growth rates in constant—
dollar G1'P variedconsiderably morethanthose incurrent-dollar GNP.The
ratios of forecast error to extrapolation erroraverageabout 0.l. when Xl is
thestandard, 0.5to o.6hea C2 is,and. the results aremuch thesanefor
eithervariable.
Table 3 surveys the performance of forecasts of percentage changes in
the price level (I) that match the real G predictions covered in Table 2.
Onthe average, thepredicted inflation rates fall short of the actual ones by
fractions of one percentage point (flues 1-3). The 1959-67 forecast sets are
lessaccurate thansimple last-change extrapolations (line Li.), and the other
sets outperform the naive models by relatively small margins, much less than
those observed for the series. The naive models work comparatively well
here, with errors averaging about 3/10 of the actual changes in IPD. Projec-
tions of the last change are in this case better than those of the averageTaB.T 3
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A$A/L Zcnonic trapolations Actu.ai.
survey,RoortMichiganata.r-tna
Mediano the Model Model Last Average Forecast Presidetb iangeaoge J (2) . (6) (7)
Prelin-iaz Revised
(8)
Mean Absolute Percentage ange, Predicted end Actual
1..195947 (9) 1.5 1.9 l.9(1.le)° 2.0
2 1962-76(15) . 3.7 3.8
3 1969-76 (8) 5.3 5.0 5.3 .
.2
5.9 6.2
Mean Absolute ror, in Percentage Points
1959-67 (9) 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.7
5 1962-76(15) 1.0 1.0 1.3 1. 0.i
6 1969-76 (8) 1.3 1. 1)1. 2.0 2.1.0.
Mean ror, in Percentage Points
7195947 (9) 0.2 0 -0.1. 0.0i -0.3
8 1962-76(15) 0.5 -o.5 -0.2 -1.0
9 1969-76 (8) -0.9 -0.6 -0.9 .0.6 -0.2 -1.2.0.
10 1959-67 (9) .389
Sqnared correi.atioa (r2) Between predicted and Actual acge
1]. 1962-76(15)
• .768 .682 .536 .508
12 1969-76 (8) .526 .581 .5ie .6o .166 .059
LTE: Forsourcesand explanationsof thedata usedin colunns 2-9, see footnotes d t.roug k, respective1', in Table 1.
'Average of end-of-year annual forecasts of the conposite price level (a weightedsu of forecasts of CPI and WPI). Se.Table 2,tfl. a, onthe weights used and sources.
bse. Table 2,rn.b.
figure in parentheses is based on weighted averages of data for CPI and UPI. Thisseries of actuals for the cposite price level, is conparable to the forecasts used in coluna 1. onl,y (ct. Table 2, fo.c).
r is negative.17
change (cols. 6-7), which is the reverse of the situation for GNP in both
current and. constant dollars. The forecasts underestimated strongly (much
more than the last-change extrapolations) the average inflation since 1961
(lines 7-9). The predicted and. actual percentage changes in the price level
are all positively correlated, but the correlations for 1969-76 are generally
lower than their counterparts for (TP and, still more so, for real GNP (lines
10-12).
Forecasts of inflation often have much in common with projectionsof the
last observed rate of inflation. To illustrate, correlations between the
errors of these forecasts and the errors of the correspond.ing extrapolations
produce the followingr2coefficients:Michigan, 1959-76: 0.51; CEA,
1962-76: 0.78; ASA/NBER, 1969-76: 0.95; Wharton, 1969-76: 0.80. For growth
rates in real G1'TP, the correlations between forecast errors arid, extrapolation
errors are alsopositive butthroughout lower, in most cases much lower.
Theseresults are not surpristng and theyhave a positive aspect inasmuch as
forecasts shou.ld be closer to extrapolations of a giventype inthose cases
where such extrapolations aremoreeffective (for an elaboration, see Mincer
and. Zarrio'witz). However, ourcomparisonsareconstrainedto naivemodels
which presumably do not representhigh standardsforeconomic forecasting.
In particular, price-level forecasts that arehighly correlatedwith last-
changeextrapolationsmust share the property'ofthe latter to lagayear
behind the actualrates of inflation. Indeed, the correlations between the
predictedchanges andtheprevious year' actual changes areallpositive
and. high: the r2 coefftcients for the foursetsof IPDforecastslisted
earlier in this paragraphare 0.76,0.87,0.81,and 0.72, respectively.
The annual percentage changes in real GNPare inverselyrelated to those
in IPDandpositively related to those in current-dollar GNP, while the last18
twovariables do not show a strongor stable association. Therelationships
between the predicted changes generally parallel the actual ones. This is
illustratedby the r2 coefficients tabulated below (for symbols, see Table 1i).
1962-76 1969-76
Actual Michigan CEA Actual Michigan CEA
RCP-IPD .567(-) .328(-) .528(-J.61i6(_).l72(-) .65l(-)
RCNP-CNP .297 .210 .222 .614J .1.61i .91
I-GNP .020 .217 .o68 .o85(-).oo .o22(-)
Theerrors of the forecasts are similarly interrelated. Table Ii. demon-
trates apervasive pattern ofnegative correlation between errors in fore-
castingreal growth andinflation(col. 1).The tendencyfor these errors to
beoffsetting, which benefits the forecasts of P in current dollars, is
most strongly in evidence for the more recent years. When forecasters over-
estimated realgrowth,-or missed a downturn and projected continued growth
instead, they typically also underestimated inflation, as in 1969-71 and
l973—7.. Underprediction of real growth occurred in 1972 and 1975-76 in
combination with overp,rediction of' inflation.
These observations, which have some precedents (Zarnowitz, 1969; Moore,
1969,1977), areconsistent with a view of the world in whichnominalGN'P
changes are predicted directly and relatively well, but their divisioninto
real and. price changes continues to pose greatproblems. Many forecasters may
agreewith that view in general terms, and. some subscribe tà models consistent
with it (a specific excznple might be the St. Iuis model in which the dollar
change in total GNP expenditure is determined mainly bythedollar change in
a measure of money stock). However, most macroeconometric models, including
the two sets covered here, have separate aggregate real demand, output, and
price level equations, and. it is not at all clear why they should predict P19T
TABLE .
CORRELATIONSBETWE ERRORS OF FORECASTS OF PERCENTAGE CHANGES
I NONA.L ONP, REAL GNP, AID lID, 1962-76
Squared. Correlation (r )
Between Forecast Errors
for for for
LineSource of i1orecast RP and. IPD RGNP and. ? lID .nd. (P
(1) (2) (3)
1962-76 (15 years)
1 Economic Report (CEA) .297(-) .359
2 Michigan model •191.() .129 .006
1969-76 (8 years)
3 Economic Report (cEA) .677(-) •o1i .259
Michigan model .68i.(-) .209 .O]Ji
5hartoamodel .311.O(.) .036 .li.66
6 ASA/NBERsurvey, median .52.(-) .013 .351
NOTE: The smbo1s RONP, lID, and (TP denote real GNP, the ip1icit price
deflator, and. nomina.]. GNP, respectively. The correlations (r) are
positive, except there the sign (-) following ther2 coeffiient
indicates that r is negative.20
better in current than in constant dollars. In fact, so'e studies of the
recentperformance of quarterlymodelsarriveat the cpposite conclusion,
namely thatthe results for real G are better than those for nominal GNP
becauseofdeficient priceforecasts(iggal, .ein, andMcCarthy; Eckatein,
Green, and. Sinai). The available evidence seans too lirnited and. too mixed.
to permit any conclusive generalizations on. this point. But it is interesting
to observe that the importance o± output errors vs. price errors ay vary
with changes in the relative roles ofrealvs. nominal factors and disturbances:
inthe1970's the errors of the GNP forecasts were for themost partbetter
correlated. with the IPDerrorsthan with theRGNP errors, whereas in the 1960t
the contrary situation obtained (Table II.,cols.2-3).21
IV. Quarterly Multiperiod Forecasts, 1970-75: An Overall Appraisal
Here we have space only for asummary ofsome earlyresultsfrom a study
in progress. The forecasts and actual data areused inthe same form as before,
but they now refer to overlapping sequences of quarters, ot simply to a series
of successive years. Our materials cover 22 quarters from 1970:3 through
1975 :, a period forwhichforecasts from several new sources are available.
Firstestimates for theprecedingyear, takenfrom thedata prior to the 1976
benchmarkrevision of the national income accounts, serve ascomparable reali-
zations. The full version of the study will include also comparisons with the
reviseddata in an integrated treatment of forecast errors and measurement
errors. Adjustments of theforecasts for base revisions, used insome fore-
cast evaluations, are regarded as questionable and. are avoided.
The mean absolute errors of GNPforecastsare close to one percentage
point (like the annual forecasts, see Table 1) for two quarters ahead, and
abouthalfofthat or less for one quarter ahead. Over longer spans, the MAE
rise more or less steadily byincrementsvaryingfrom0.3 to 0.5 of one per-
centage point for each additional quarter; they approachand exceed 2 percen-
tage points for l1.-quarter and 5-quarter spans, and 3 percentage points for
7-quarter and. 8-quarter spans, respectively (Table 5,lines1-3). Consistent
with earlier findings and interpretations for various types of multiperiod
forecasts (see, e.g., Zarnowitz, 1967, pp. 60-72), the MAE increase less than
in proportion to the extension of the span. The errors in forecasts of
percentagechanges expressed on a per-unit-of-time basis (roughly, errors
dividedby the length of the effective span) neither rise nor decline syste-
matically as the forecast reaches further into the future. The same applies
to the errors of the implicit predictions of changes during the successive22
TABLE 5
StTh'fl1ARY ASUPES OF ERROR FOR QUARTERLY MtJI2IPERIOD
PRICTIONS OF PERCEITAGE CEANGE mP,1970-75
neForecast
Seta
Span o± Forecast in Quartersb
One Two ThreeFourFive SixSeven
(1) (2) (3) (ii.) (5) (6) (7)Eit
(8)








.53 1.014. 1.11.3 1.911. 2.11.3 2.69 2.95










.01 .014. .02 .08 -.111. -.66-1.11.8
-.01 .11 .05 .11 .01 -.1i.2-1.12











.752 .11.51 .107 .058 .127 .l31. .179
.632 .11.69 .069.000*.008 .102 .211.9











.211.1 .287 .291 .268 .236 .218 .198
.2811. .292 .299 .295 .272 .218 .182




aChase. Chase Econometric Associates, Inc.; DRI:Data Resources, Inc.; GE:
MAPCASTgroupat the General Electric Company. The forecast data arethose ased
anddescribed inS.K. McNees, 1975, 1976.ChaseandDRIare"early-quarter
forecasters,"while GEisa "late-quarter forecaster" (for the release dates,
see McNees, i976,p. 11.1).
bNerofforecasts covered (a) for spans 1 to 7, respectively:22, 21, 20, 19,
18, 17, and16(for each of the sets). For span 8,thenumber is 15 (Chase), 111.
(DRI), and 12 (GE).
CDefining the predicted change andtheactual change (for the given set,variable,
1
period., and span) as and. At,respectively, MAE =Ee ,whereet =
- At.
d. =Eee =VEe/ZA,separately for each span. *r is negative.23
single quarters covered; it is the cumulation of theseintraforecast (umarginalfl)
change errors that technically accounts for the tendencyof errors in the total
predicted changes to grow with thespan.3
Vhereboth forecasts and realizations refer to increases (asthey do
most of thetime by farinthe case of ip), rrors of positive sign denote
overestimationof actual change. The mean errors in Table 5, lines14._6,are
predominantlysmall and. positive, except for the longer spans where some of
them arelargeand. negative. As will be shown below,
these averages conceal large errors of opposite sign in the forecasts for some
of the different economic phases of the period 1970-75.
2
Thercoefficients for the correlations between the predicted and.
actual changes In P exceed o.6 or 0.7 for one quarter ahead (like the annual
forecasts)and. exceed. Q•1.or 0.5 for two quarters ahead. Theyaremuch smaller
forthelongerspans, mostly in the 0.1-0.25 range,ina few cases nearzero
(lines 7-9).
Theil?s inequality coefficients generally fall between 0.2 and0.3
(lines 10—12). This indicatesthat these forecasts are all much better
thana naive model extrapolating the last recorded percentage change(for
whichU =1).That model, it should be noted, is but a minimal standard
foreconomic forecasts. Interestingly, theU coefficients do not increase
with the forecast span;infact, they decline slitly below .2 for thelongestspans.
Thenexttwotableshave the sane format as Table 5,whichfacilitates
presentationand comparisons of these measu.res. Real GNP forecasts have MAE
(in percentage points) rising from o.-o.6 for one quarter aheadto-6for
3Note that fewer observations are available for the longer spans (Table 5,
b). This reduces the comparability of the measures reported for the differ-
ent spans, but does noteliminate it.214.
6
SUMMARYASUPES OF ERROR FOR QUARTERI?L MTJLTIPERIOD PREDICTIONS
OF PERCE1TAGE CHANGE m REAL GNP, 1970-75
.LineForecast
Seta
Span of Forecast in Qjlartersb
One TwoThreeFourFiveSix SevenEight
(1) (2) (3) (ii.) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean Absolute Error, in Percentage ixits ()C
1 Chase .511.111.81 2.11.63.29 11..19 )4..955.31
2 DRI .611.372.082.753.524.154..78
3 GE .501.201.752.152.803.80 14..765.15
Mean Error, in Percentage PDints ()d
14. Chase .17 .51 .92 1.11.61.982.382.632.82
5 DRI .26 .77 1.201.822.593.163.66 14..72
6 GE .00 .22 .36 .9 1.532.09 2.11.6
Squared Correlation (r2) Between Predicted and Actual
2.58
Change
7 Chase .839 .81'7 .727 .703.733 .710 .6o14..596
8 DRI .793 .711.5 .598 .814. .785 .827 .711.1.638
9 GE .808 .711.1 .677 .607 .772 .7614. .661.662
e
Theil'sInequality Coefficient (13)
10 Chase .11.33 .502 .607 .673 .711.74l.758 .711.1 II DRI •5O1 .622 .721 .769 .781 .7711. .771i .836
12 GE .11.27 .1198 .511.8 .606.627.676 .71ji .6911
Footnotes a throughe: Seethecorrespondingfootnotes in Table 5.25
eightquarters ahead, that is, somewhat more than in proportion to the measured
span(Table 6,lines1-3). The errors for the twoshortestspans arenotmuch
larger than those for GP in current dollars, but the errors for the longest
spansare 50to100 percent larger. The u.nusually rapid build-up of the MAE
can be traced in large part to turning point errors. In quarterly multiperiod.
forecasting, turning points are more frequent and more difficult to predict
thaninannual forecasting, but the errors associated with them matter much
more yet: here, missing a turn often means that a whole chain of predictions
for thesubsequent observations is badly off.
The meanerrors of these forecasts areallpositive, which is largely
due to the effects of missing or underestimating the declines in real GNP
duringthe recession (Table 6,lines1i.6).Thealso cumulate continuously
and. rapidlyhere, quite nriltke those for thenominal GNPforecasts. On the
other hand, the r2coefficientsarerather surprisingly high in Table6,
lines7-9,muchabove the corresponding figures for (2PinTable 5,particularly
for spans of 3-8quarters.Relative to the size oftheactual changes, however,
the real (Perrorsaremuchlargerthanthe current—dollar GNP errors:
the inequality coefficients rise from •14—.5to.7—.8(Table6,lines
10-12).
TheMAE offorecasts of inflation in terms of the Pimplicit price
deflatorare like those of the (p forecasts for the shortest spans--O.5 or
less one quarter ahead, approximately 1percentagepoint twoquartersahead--
butthey cumulate rapidly, especially for the longest spans (Table 7, lines
1-3). The figures for the eight-quarter-ahead predictions areheremore than
12 times as large as those for the one-quarter-ahead predictions. This
exceptionallystrong build-up of errors reflects a progression of under-
estimates of the inflation rates, rising more than inproportiontothespan
extensions (Table 7,lines1.-6).26
TABLE7
SIThARY ASURES OF ERROR FOR QUARTERLY MtJLTIPERIOD PREDICTIONS
OF PERCENTAGE CEANGE fl E PRICE LEVEL, 1970-75
neForecast
Seta
Span of Forecast, in Quartersb
One Two ThreeFourFive SixSeven
(1) (2) (3) (14.) (5) (6) (7)
Eight
(8)




Chase .39 1.02 1.61;. 2.29 2.98 3.87 4.88
DRI .514. 1.11 1.69 2.37 3.05 4.01;. 5.17
























.6oo .11.40 .3911. .287 .211.6 .233 .320
.14.78 .426 .412 .346.4oi .398 .384











.311 .358 .377 .410 .438 .462 .480
.375.38 .397 .422 .444 .475.508




Footnotes a through e: See the corresponding footnotes to Table 5.27
Ther2coefficients for the IPD inflation forecasts aregenerally
higher than thosefor the forecastsof percentage change innominalGITP
(exceptfor a few short predictions) but throughout lowerthan the correspond-
ing statisticsfor the real growth forecasts. They range from .23 to .66and
tend to decrease as the spans lengthen (Table 7,lines7-9).TheU coeffi-
cients (lines 10—12) are close to .2 for the shorter spans and close to .5for
the longest; they are thus higher than their counterparts for the current—dollar
GNP forecasts but lower than those for the real GNP forecasts.
The quantityand price ingredients of the TPforecasts show a pattern
of offsetting errors in thequarterlyaswellas annual data. The irtean errors
of real growth predictions are aLl, positive, those of inflation predictions
all negative, and. these statistics, matched by source and span, have similar
absolute values for most of the shorter forecastsAs a result, the ?€ of
the current-doll:ar tP forecasts for spans 1_li. are as a rule positive but very
smallfor chase and DRI, negative but smallfor GE. The negative of the
inflationforecasts outweighthe positive of the real growth forecasts in
spans5-8, so that theof the percentage changeforecastsfor Pare pre-
dnmiriantlynegative and substantial (of. lines k-6inTables ,6, and7).
Thesurveyed accuracy measuresdo not show anyof the forecasters to be
consistently superior to the others. They dofavorGE over Chase and.DRI in
most instances, but by modest marginsand in a way thatcan be explainedby an
advantage in timing:theGE forecastsare issued late ineach quarter, the
others early.
Theresults reported in this study should and will be carefully conipared
with those of other evaluations of the same forecasts, but the task is still
to be completed.Theerrormeasures used here differ inseveral respects
from those used by others,and additionalcomputations are required to allow
for these differences.28
V. Quarterly Multiperiod Forecasts: An Analysis by Su.bperiods
The period l97O:3-l975:4, although short, was unusuallyvariedand.
marked by major disturbances arid drastic changes in the economy's course. It
isuseful to divide it into the following parts, as suggested by the contemporary
business-cycle and inflationary developments.
I. 1970:3-1973:1. Endofthemild.1970recessionfollowed by an
expansion that accelerated in 1972, with relatively
stable inflation.
II.1973:l_1973:!.. Slower real growth and a sharp inflation speedu.p
(materialsshortages, run-ups in commodity prices,
oil embargo).
III. 1973:1._1975:1. Recession, severe in its last two quarters, accoin-
panied first bya furtherriseand then by a dxwri-
turn in the rate of inflation.
IV. 19'7:1_197:11. Sharpupturn aridthe initial recovery phase, with
a further decline in inflation.
One question is whether forecasts that originated in these four sub-
periods show significantly different characteristics and performance. The
other is whether forecasts for these subperiods (i.e., those that aimed at
thecorresponding groups oftarget quarters) aresodifferentiated. It turns
outthat the answers to both questions are definitely yes.
To illustrate the first point, the expansion phase I produced forecasts
that underestimated growth in dollar GNP mainly because they underestimated
inflation. The percentage changes in real GNP were partly underpredicted,
partly (in some longer forecasts) overpredicted, but whether negative or
positive the of these forecasts were small. In general, the record of the29
forecaststhat were madeduring theperiodI was good in tezs of both the ME
andthe MAE figures, even for the long spans. In contrast, the slowdown
phaseII produced real growthpredictions with very large positive ME and
inflationforecasts withvery large negativeME (widerestimation errors).
These errors balanced each other so thattheME for the nominalGMP predictions
weremoderate (and mostlynegative,except for thelongest forecasts).The
recession phase I gave rise to even larger positive mean errors in the real
growthforecasts as the declines were repeatedly missed anii,when finally
recognized,underestimated. These errors were larger absolutely thanthe
negativeerrors onthe price side, which reflected a continuing underestimation
ofinflation, so that the predictions of' the growth ratesin nominal GNPhad
consistentlypositive ME inthe subperiodIII.
The above sIimrny is based on charts (not reproduced here) which show
the average errors (MAE andME) byspanandby subperiod. in which the fore-
casts originated.These charts look very similar for such different models
as Chase and DRI: they show in each case the same strild.ng differences
between the forecasts made insubperiods I,II, and III. The suggested infer-
ence is that concurrent predictions from different sources and models have
common patterns such that their errors depend strongly and similarly on the
characteristics of the time of their origin.
In a second exercise, the forecasts were assigned to the four stibperiods
according to their target quarters,not their basequarters, as illustrated
InCharts 1-3. Here the samples arepartitioned differently, hence the
resulting patternsdiverge fromthose obtained on thefirst plan, but the
LI. .
Noaverages for phase IV are used on this basis, since they contain too
few observations in the truncated. sample.30
conclusionis analogous: the type and size of forecast errors depend criti-
cally on the economic properties of the target periods vis--visthoseof the
periods of origin. Forecasters perform best when the twoperiodsare alike,
belonging to the same already recognized phase, e.g., a continuing expansion
as in 1971-72(most ofsubperiod. I). They perform worst when the target
falls into a new phase, particularly when the latter departs sharply from the
currently established pattern (forecasts made in. subperiods II and. III, and
those for subperiods III and. IV provide many examples, particularly in the
long-span categories). Such period characteristics are much more important
determinants of forecast errors than are any differences among the forecasters.
Chart 1 shows that both Chase and DRI persistently underestimated the
percentage changes in GI'TP for su.bperiods I and., much more strongly, II. Both
forecasters overestimated the changes in their short forecasts for subperiod
III and. underestimated them in their long forecasts for the same phase. Over-
est.mates prevailed. in all forecasts for the last phase covered., IV, and. here
the average errors behave in an unusual fashion, first increasing and then
decreasing with the lengthening span.. This is due to offsets between. the
real growth forecasts with positive ME and the inflation. forecasts with
negative ME (see Charts 2 and 3).
Chart 2, which covers the real growth forecasts, shows u.nderestimates
dominating the errors for I and. II, much larger MAE aud. positive lylE for III
and. IV. The huge average errors for the two latter phases derive mainly
from the forecasters' failure to predict the declines in real GNPI5 The long-
span errors for the 1975 recovery (IV) are strikingly large here.
5The changeerrors, -
At(see Table 5forthe symbols), are positive
where P >0 and.At < 0,and. also where < 0 and At < 0 but
At. These cases dominate in Chart 2 the results for both the recession
phase III and. the recovery phase IV. Although real GNP reached a trough in
1975:1 and increased thereafter, the actual changes over longer spans ending
in 1975 are negative; that is, real GNP was lower during period IV than in.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Theinflation forecasts also had, very large average errors in the
recessionperiod (III), as demonstrated in chart3.Theirerrorswere rela-
tively smallinsubperiod I, considerably largerandon balance all negative
inII; in neither phase did. they increase strongly withthespan. The short
forecasts for phase IV had small errors; in several cases their means are
positive, ind.icating overestimation of inflationrates that just began to
decline.The long forecasts for this last subperiod, however, had very large
underestimationerrors.
VI. Concluding Observations
The end-of-year forecasts of annual percentage changes in TP earn good
marks for overall accuracy when judged according to realistic' rather than
ideal standards. Moreover, they are found to have improved in the period
since the early 1960' s compared with the previous years after World War ii.
The corresponding forecasts for 1P in constant dollars (real growth)
and IPD(inflation)are weaker. The formersuffer from largeturning-point
errors, the latter fromlargeunderestimation errors.But the errorsin.fore-
casts of real growth are negatively correlated with the errors in forecasts
of inflation, which helped to make the nominal GNP predictions more accurate.
In recent times, these correlations were connectedwith the unexpected con-
cu.rrenceof accelerating inflation andslowing, thendeclining output rates:
optimistically,and probably alsofrom alingering faithina simple iillips
trade-off,forecasters kept anticipating less inflation and. more growth. But
in the late 190's and. early 1960's, it was the relative stability of the
price level that caused widespread surprisesand. offsettingerrors resulted
from the opposite combination of overestimates of inflation and. underestimates
of real growth.CHART 3
QUARTERLYMTJLTIPERIOD FORECASTS OF PERCENTAGE CHANGES 'mE ThIPLICIT PRICE DEFLATOR,
AVERAGE ERRORS BY SUBPERIOD AND SPAN, TWO MODEI, 197O-7
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Legend:SeeChart1 (p. 31).
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Forecastsof inflation are not much better than projections of the most
recently observed inflation rates, and. they lag behind the actual rates much
like such projections. The deficiency of price-level forecasts, documented.
in this and other studies, surely impairs the general ability of economists to
analyze the prospects for the economy. provements will require major
advances in our knowledge, presumably through research based on carefully
worked out data (abstract speculation abounds bat good. information and. observa-
tion are rare in this area).
The favorable record of annual G? pred.ictioris does not imply that fore-
casters can perform well the more difficult task of predicting quarterly
changes in '1P within the year ahead or even beyond it. Forecasts for the
year as a whole can be satisfactory when based on a good record. for the first
.6
twoquarters; they tend. to be more accurate than forecasts witt longer spans.
An examination of the recent xnultiperiod. predictions shows that the errors
for real GNP and IPD cumulated rapidly beyond the spans of 2 to 1 quarters.
Previous studies have shown the cumulation to be as a rule less than propor-
tionalto the increase in the span, but in this period the build-up of errors
was muchgreaterthan usual. No doubt, in less turbulent times the longer
forecasts can be considerably more accurate, but this fair-weather argument
isnot very persuasive or helpful. At thepresenttime, the predictive value
of detailed forecasts reachingoutfurther than a few quarters ahead must be
rather heavily discounted. Again, what is critical here is theoretical analy-
sis and empirical research that would lead to improvements in ourabilityto
errors of predictions for the individual parts oftheyear at
timesoffset each other to some degree (Zarriowitz, 1967; McNees, 1973, i97).
These gains from aggregation over time resemble those from aggregation over
sectors(GNP ispredicted with smaller average errors of relativechangethan
are most ofits components; see Zarnowitz, 1967, 1972; PrommandKlein, 1976).36
predictbroad xnoveents in the price level arid. basiness-crcle turning points.
Despite setbacks, there is still no reason to give up moderate hopes for an.
u.ltiate advance on these fronts.37
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